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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GALEN L. JONAS, : Case No. 880411-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from a judgment and 
conviction for Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 
76-6-412(1)(b) (1978); Theft by Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 
76-6-412(1)(c) (1978); and Theft by Receiving, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 
76-6-412(1)(b) (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge, presiding. Following briefing and oral argument, this Court 
issued its opinion in State v. Jonas. Case No. 880411-CA, on May 22, 
1990, affirming the conviction. A copy of the Court's opinion is 
attached as Addendum A. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Brown v. Pickard. denying 
reh'cr, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions . . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cumminas v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah 
1913), the Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will establish 
that, applying these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. In its opinion in 
State v. Jonas, No. 880411-CA (filed May 22, 1990) (attached as 
Addendum A), this Court misapprehended and/or misconstrued the facts 
and law. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The facts and circumstances of this case establish that 
the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to excuse Juror 
Smith for cause. The Courts opinion ignores the juror,s repeatedly 
expressed concerns that she could not be impartial and failed to 
consider the dictates of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), that "a later assertion by the juror 
that he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot attenuate the 
earlier expressions of bias." 
The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that 
the contact between the bailiff and jurors was more than brief and 
incidental in nature, and the State failed to rebut the presumption 
of prejudice raised by the nature of the contact. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
(See Addendum B for Text.) 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Article I, § 7, Utah Constitution 
Article I, § 12, Utah Constitution 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURTS DECISION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH MISAPPLIES THE 
FACTS AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING CASE LAW. 
In reaching its decision that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause, 
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this Court determined that the juror's responses did not raise an 
inference of partiality or prejudice. State v. Jonas. Case No. 
880411-CA (filed May 22, 1990). The Court focused on the juror's 
statement that she might be "a little" influenced if the case 
involved tools and determined that 
This case did not involve tools, so it could be 
inferred that the prior experience did not 
influence her at all. 
Jonas, slip op. at 8. The Court's decision ignores the juror's 
later statement that it probably would be difficult for her to be 
impartial. Id. at 7. It also ignores the obvious fact that both 
the crime in which the juror had been a victim and the crime before 
the Court in the instant case were theft related. It further fails 
to take into account her repeated expressions of concern that she 
would be biased and her emotional response to police officers' 
failure to get the tools back. 
In State v. Suarez, Case No. 880309-CA (filed May 25, 
1990), an opinion issued three days after the opinion in the instant 
case, a different panel in this Court, comprised of Judges Orme, 
Davidson and Billings, reversed a criminal conviction and remanded 
the case for a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to 
excuse for cause a juror who gave inconsistent responses to similar 
voir dire questions in two separate courtrooms. The defendant in 
Suarez filed an affidavit from the defense attorney in another case 
which indicated that the juror at issue had indicated in the other 
courtroom that he was biased in favor of police testimony. Relying 
on State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984), and State v. 
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Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980), a panel of this Court 
determined that the juror should have been excused for cause. 
Suarez, slip op. at 9. Given the direct statements by the juror in 
this case that it would probably be difficult for her to be fair and 
impartial, the same result should have been reached in the instant 
case. 
This Court also determined that even if an inference were 
raised, the juror's subsequent responses showed that her concern was 
merely the product of a "light impression" and not one that would 
"close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in 
opposition [citation omitted]." On the contrary, her final 
statement acknowledged her emotional reaction to the incident. 
Furthermore, after numerous other statements which indicated an 
emotional reaction to the fact the police "didn't do anything" and 
she still had not gotten her possessions back, and a repeated 
concern that she might be influenced by the incident, a single 
statement by the juror that she believed she could be impartial does 
not "attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Jones, 734 
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), citing State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 
(Utah 1981): 
When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of 
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or 
she can render an impartial verdict cannot 
attenuate the earlier expressions of bias. 
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Mr. Jonas respectfully requests rehearing on this issue 
and that he be granted a new trial based on the trial judge's abuse 
of discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause. 
POINT II. THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE BAILIFF AND 
JURORS WAS MORE THAN INCIDENTAL, AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE RAISED BY THAT CONTACT 
WAS NOT REBUTTED. 
In its opinion, this Court determined that "the contact 
between the bailiff and the jurors before the jury began 
deliberating was an incidental contact raising no presumption of 
prejudice." Jonas, slip op. at 12. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Jonas argued that the contact 
raised a presumption of prejudice. 
Although there is disagreement as to the 
specifics of what the bailiff said to the jurors 
in this case ( . . . ) , the information which is 
included in the transcript establishes that the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was 
more than brief and incidental and went beyond 
mere civilties. At the very least, the bailiff 
informed the jurors of the reason that another 
juror had been excused. He made them aware that 
the juror's sister had been murdered in a highly 
publicized incident that had occurred over the 
weekend. 
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors 
of a reason for excusing another juror was outside 
his role as a bailiff and went beyond any 
permissible contact that might be allowed as part 
of his duties in shepherding the jury. The 
statement tended to heighten the jurors7 awareness 
of crime in the community and would give rise to 
all of the reactions, fears and concerns that 
people feel when considering society's current 
level of criminal activity. The nature of the 
information was far more intense and of a more 
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a 
conversation about a bunged toe or a witness7 
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job. In addition, any follow-up commentary by the 
jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific 
incident or crime in general, none of which was 
recorded but which it is reasonable to assume 
occurred, could have a significant prejudicial 
impart on a criminal defendant whose case was 
currently being tried. 
Information to the jurors regarding the 
reason for excusing Mr. Davis should have been 
carefully controlled. Instead, the bailiff 
imparted the information in a completely 
uncontrolled situation where Mr. Jonas and his 
attorney had no opportunity to hear what was said 
and no opportunity to have input or comment on the 
information or to object to it being conveyed. 
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as 
an extension of the court and because his position 
is that of a court official, his statements carry 
great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 
[363 (1966)] at 365. Furthermore, he has a 
responsibility to monitor and control his actions 
and statements while in the presence of the jury 
so as to not taint them. Since the bailiff's 
contact with the jury as a whole went beyond one 
of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice was raised by his 
unauthorized comments. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 27-8. This argument is based on the 
facts and circumstances of the instant case and is not merely an 
assumption that the presumption was raised. 
The State agreed in this case that the presumption was 
raised, stating: 
Despite being a brief and a natural outgrowth of 
the relationship between bailiff and jury, it is 
reasonable to classify the encounter as one in 
which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice would 
rise. 
State's Brief at 45. Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this 
Court reconsider its decision that the presumption was not raised in 
the instant case. 
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Both of the reasons for the rule, as articulated in 
State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1980), are applicable to 
situations where a bailiff rather than a witness has unauthorized 
contact with jurors. First, it is inherently difficult to prove the 
effect of the contact on the juror, and second, the appearance of 
impropriety causes a deleterious effect upon the judicial process. 
Because the bailiff is an extension of the court and wears an emblem 
of authority, he has a greater potential for impact on a juror than 
many witnesses. 
This Court states that M[t]here was no exchange at all 
because the jurors said nothing." Jonas, slip op. at 12. The facts 
in this case do not support such a statement; the bailiff was not 
asked and did not volunteer information regarding the statements or 
physical reactions made in response to the information. Mr. Jonas 
contends that the State had the burden of establishing lack of 
prejudice once the presumption arose; the State failed to establish 
that the jurors said or did nothing in response, and this Court 
erroneously determined that no such exchange* occurred. 
Although the truth of the bailiff's statement is not at 
issue, its impact on the jurors is. If jurors were discussing high 
crime rates or emotional reactions to crime with the bailiff, or 
even among themselves, in response to the bailiff's information, 
they were impacted by the information. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court either 
reverse his conviction or rehear the issues set forth herein. 
DATED this \°l day of June, 1990. 
<^Cu}(2>/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
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ADDENDUM A 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Galen L. Jonas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAY 2 2/990 
M *>• Court 
Dtth OLun •* Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880411-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Jay Banks 
Attorneys: Joan Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
three counts of theft: (1) theft by receiving, a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) 
and § 76-6-412(b) (1978), on July 17, 1985, and (2) on July 30, 
1985, and (3) theft by receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 
§ 76-6-412(c) (1978), on July 25, 1985. We affirm. 
Defendant seeks reversal of the convictions or a new 
trial on five grounds: (1) insufficient evidence; (2) failure 
to excuse a prospective juror for cause; (3) a bailiff's 
allegedly improper contact with jurors; (4) failure of the 
court reporter to provide an accurate transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing on a motion for mistrial; and (5) denial of 
a motion to recuse the trial judge. We will review each of 
defendant's challenges in turn. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
The standard of review of a jury verdict challenge based 
on insufficiency of the evidence is as follows: 
[W]e view the evidence presented and all 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the verdict. 
Where there is any evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
it/ from which findings of all the elements 
of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable 
doubt/ our inquiry is complete and we will 
sustain the verdict. 
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3/ 10 (1989) (citations 
omitted). Stated another way# we will reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence/ 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict/ "'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" 
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123/ 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Markham, 750 P.2d 599/ 601 (Utah 1988)). 
In August 1986/ defendant was charged with seven counts of 
theft by receiving arising out of separate transactions in 1985 
and 1986. Four of the transactions occurred in July 1985. 
There were no transactions between July 30/ 1985/ and March 4, 
1986. The three 1986 transactions took place in March/ April/ 
and May. 
There was no essential difference in the State's evidence 
regarding each of the seven transactions. The police conducted 
a sting operation. On each occasion charged/ an undercover 
police officer sold/ and defendant purchased, various 
merchandise/ consisting principally of equipment and appliances 
that the police had purchased beforehand or that was unclaimed 
evidence in police custody.2 In each instance/ the officer 
posed as a thief or fence selling stolen goods for about 
2. The merchandise purchased in the seven transactions was, 
respectively/ (1) Fischer VCR and Samsung TV, (2) Toshiba TV, 
(3) RCA and Magnavox video recorders, (4) three microwave 
ovens, (5) chain saw# (6) grill/ air compressor, and kerosene 
lantern, and (7) Fischer VCR. 
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ten cents on the dollar. He usually wore an audio recorder and 
some transactions were videorecorded. These recordings were 
played and submitted to the jury. The police documented the 
goods sold and the monies defendant paid. 
Defendant does not dispute the State's evidence. Instead, 
he claims that he knew the property he received in July 1985 
was not stolen. Thus, he asserts that he did not have the 
culpable mental state that is a necessary element of the crime 
charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1989) provides, 
with our emphasis: 
A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, 
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding any such 
property from the owner, knowing the 
property to be stolen, with a purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. 
Defendant testified that he recognized as a police officer the 
undercover agent who sold him the merchandise in July 1985. 
Defendant also testified that he knew before all of the 
transactions that the property was not stolen. He claimed that 
this knowledge was based on information provided to him by two 
persons, James Lawrence Prater, a confidential police 
informant, and defendant's acquaintance, Officer Brown. 
Defendant and his wife testified that Prater told them in July 
1985 about the sting operation but said "not to worry about it, 
that the merchandise was not stolen." Prater had arranged the 
first meeting between defendant and the undercover officer. 
Prater was not available at trial to corroborate or rebut the 
conversation testimony. On the other hand, Officer Brown did 
testify. Brown stated that in the fall of 1985, after the July 
transactions, defendant told him that he had been introduced by 
Prater to a man who had some damaged warehouse property that he 
would sell cheap to defendant. Defendant told Brown he thought 
Prater might be an undercover officer or an informant. 
Defendant's next contact with Brown was on March 29, 1986, when 
he directed Brown to an anticipated drug transaction which did 
not materialize. In May or June 1986, defendant spoke to Brown 
again. He showed Brown some property and asked Brown to check 
the national computer system, NCIC, to see if it was stolen. 
Brown remembered seeing an air compressor, saw blades, and a 
television. Defendant also gave Brown some serial numbers to 
check out. Brown reported to defendant that those items were 
not stolen. Brown believed that the checking on NCIC was done 
before defendant's arrest on August 1/ 1986. But police 
records indicated only one NCIC check by Brown/ on August 14/ 
1986. 
Defendant was convicted on the 1985 charges and acquitted 
on the 1986 charges. The jury could have chosen to disbelieve 
defendant's story about the 1985 Prater conversation/ his 
recognition of the property seller as a police officer/ and his 
knowledge about the status of the property at the time he 
received it in July 1985/ even if they accepted defendant's and 
Brown's testimony regarding defendant's knowledge or belief 
regarding the unstolen status of the property he received in 
1986. The jury, not the appellate court/ performs the function 
of determining the credibility of a witness's testimony. State 
v. Lactod. 761 P.2d 23/ 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A person may 
be convicted of theft by receiving even if the property is not 
in fact stolen property. State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169/ 1173 
(Utah 1985)/ if the State proves that the defendant acted under 
the belief that the property was stolen, ifi. at 1172. Unless 
evidence that supports the jury's verdict is so insubstantial 
that the jury must necessarily have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged/ we are 
obligated to assume the jury believed the evidence which 
supports the verdict. State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878/ 884 (Utah 
1981). Nor will we overturn a conviction merely because the 
jury chose not to believe the defendant. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 
27. There is substantial evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably conclude that defendant/ at the time of the July 
1985 transactions/ believed that the property was stolen, 
despite his self-serving assertion at trial that he believed 
otherwise in July 1985. We therefore reject defendant's 
challenge to the jury's verdict. 
JURY SELECTION 
After the completion of jury voir dire, defendant 
challenged one member of the venire for cause. Defense 
counsel/ in an unreported conference at the bench/ excepted to 
the trial court's denial of that request. The next day, 
defense counsel entered his exception upon the record in the 
following form: 
MR. YENGICH: . . . I failed—the Court 
allowed me to take exception to the 
Court's failure to— 
880411-CA 4 
THE COURT: Make a record. 
MR. YENGICH: —exclude Juror Number— 
prospective Juror No. 6. She is the lady 
that indicated she had been burglarized in 
the past and initially said— 
THE COURT: Ten or twenty years before/ 
wasn't it? 
MR. YENGICH: Well, I don't know. The 
record will speak to that. She indicated 
initially an indication that she did not 
think she could be fair and impartial and 
I at the ben[ch] excepted to her as 
indicating an implied bias of that 
particular juror and I used a peremptory 
challenge to strike her. 
THE COURT: The record may so show.£33 
Defendant's exception was based on the following voir dire 
colloquy between the trial court and juror Smith: 
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate to 
ask this question, but I'm obligated to. 
Have any of you been the victims of a 
theft? And that, as I've indicated to you 
before what a theft really is, taking 
property of another with intent to 
permanently deprive them, or in 
receiving. Well, we'll take that first. 
I saw some hands go up in the jury box. 
All right. Mrs. Smith? I assume all you 
women are married unless you tell me 
otherwise. 
3. Although defense counsel spoke of "implied bias," the 
record indicates that the court and opposing counsel understood 
that the legal basis of the challenge to prospective juror 
Smith for cause was "actual bias." Subsections (e)(1) through 
(e)(13) of Utah R. Crim. P. 18 state grounds of implied bias or 
bias at law, i.e., bias arising from status. Subsection 
(e)(14) sets forth actual bias, i.e., bias arising from state 
of mind, as a ground for a challenge for cause. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my 
husband had about $13/000 worth of tools 
stolen about a year and a half ago which 
we have never— 
THE COURT: Did a criminal act result from 
that—or action? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was 
reported to the police, which they didn't 
do anything about, and we still have never 
gotten— 
THE COURT: They didn't find it? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: (shook head 
from side to side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: About a year 
and a half ago. 
THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind, 
as I indicated, there are different 
parties involved, but sometimes based on 
our experience we allow that to interfere 
with our thinking. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It might be. 
If it was tools, I might be a little 
influenced. 
THE COURT: Well, wait just a minute. Let 
me ask the questions and you just answer 
the question. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: All right. 
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, do you 
believe that that incident would make it 
difficult for you to be fair and 
impartial, particularly to this Defendant, 
as well as the people of the state of Utah? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It's a little 
hard to say. 
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THE COURT: Well/ you just take time to 
think it over because we—you're the one 
that— 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It probably 
would/ yes. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs.— 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Smith/ Donna 
Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe that you 
could set those facts aside and make a 
determination on the evidence that's 
presented in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I—well/ yes# 
I believe I could be impartial. 
THE COURT: We know you didn't like to 
lose the tools. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: NO/ I didn't. 
Defendant's objection to prospective juror Smith is based 
on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) (codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982)/ repealed effective July 1/ 
1990)/ which provides: 
The challenge for cause is an objection to 
a particular juror and may be taken on one 
or more of the following grounds: 
. . . . 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause/ or to either party/ which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging . . . . 
On appeal/ defendant contends the trial judge committed 
reversible error by rejecting his challenge of Smith for 
cause. In his brief/ he summarizes this claim of error as 
follows: 
The trial judge abused his discretion in 
failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause 
after she indicated that she had been a 
victim of a crime similar to the crime 
charged and that she believed such 
experience would interfere with her 
ability to be impartial. 
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). When reviewing such 
a ruling, we reverse only if the trial court has abused that 
discretion by committing harmful error. !£. The general rule 
concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court 
••will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary.- Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 
1984); £££ State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). 
An appellant has the burden of establishing that reversible 
error resulted from an abuse of discretion. State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
A court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror 
who should have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 
461; State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989); Bishop, 
753 P.2d at 451. When comments are made by a juror which 
facially bring into question that prospective juror's 
partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may occur 
unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the 
inference rebutted or dismisses the juror. See Cobb, 774 P.2d 
at 1127. 
The Cobb holding suggests a two-part procedure. When the 
threshold of apparent partiality or prejudice is crossed and an 
inference arises, the court must determine from further inquiry 
of the venire member whether the inference is rebutted. Thus, 
our first question is: Did Smith's initial comments raise an 
inference of partiality and prejudice on her part as to this 
cause or this defendant? We think not* She stated that the 
prior theft of her husband's tools might influence her thinking 
a little, if this case involved tools. This case did not 
involve tools, so it could be inferred that the prior 
experience would not influence her at all. As the trial court 
pressed her further, she expressed some concern while weighing 
her feelings about her ability to be fair but, upon final 
weighing, she expressed affirmative belief in her impartiality. 
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Juror Smith's mild initial responses are in stark contrast to 
those of the two prospective jurors in State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), who crossed the Cobb threshold. They 
stated that their strong adverse emotional responses as former 
crime victims would affect their thinking; Smith did not. They 
identified a residue of personal trauma which would compromise 
their capacity for objectivity; Smith did not. Their expressed 
states of mind supported an inference that they could not act 
with impartiality/ defined as "a mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference- in State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799/ 801 (Utah 
1977)/ while Smith's expressed state of mind did not support a 
similar inference. 
Finally/ even assuming, arguendo, that Smith's initial 
comments raised on their face a threshold inference of 
partiality and prejudice, her subsequent responses to the 
judge's questioning show her concern was merely the product of 
a "light impression" and not one that would "close the mind 
against the testimony that might be offered in opposition." 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765/ 
768 (Utah 1980)). 
For these reasons/ we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendant's request 
for removal of Smith from the jury panel for cause. 
BAILIFF CONTACT 
The parties rested their presentations on Friday, April 22, 
1988/ after four days of trial. The trial court then scheduled 
jury instruction and closing arguments for Monday morning/ 
April 25. That weekend, a sister of juror Davis was shot to 
death during a robbery of a local video store. Juror Davis 
informed the court on Monday morning that he could not continue 
as a juror due to the fact that his pregnant sister had been 
murdered. Upon stipulation of counsel/ the court excused Davis 
from further jury duty and an alternate juror moved into 
Davis's place on the jury. Davis, upon his departure from the 
courthouse/ asked the bailiff to explain his absence to the 
other jurors, and the bailiff then did so. 
Defense counsel, upon learning of the bailiff's contact 
with the jury, moved for a mistrial because the bailiff "did 
inform them of that." The court denied the motion without 
prejudice. Later, the bailiff was placed under oath and 
testified as follows about his contact with the jury: 
(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed Bailiff 
HUGH BELL under oath, who testified as 
follows:) 
THE COURT: State your name. 
THE WITNESS: Hugh Bell. 
THE COURT: And you are Deputy Sheriff? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Bailiff of this court? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: This morning at nine o'clock 
Mr. Davis came in and stated reasons to 
the Court why he would like to be excused 
from the case, and would you tell us the 
sequence of events that happened after he 
left the chambers? 
THE WITNESS: He came into the courtroom 
and asked for statement of service on his 
jury duty and I went to Joan, found where 
the statement was, got her to fill one out 
for him, gave it to him. I walked to the 
door and expressed my sympathy to him and 
everything, and he asked me if I would 
tell the rest of the jurors what happened, 
why he was excused. 
THE COURT: And what did you do? 
THE WITNESS: I went in and I told them 
that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his 
sister was the lady that was shot out in 
West Valley. 
THE COURT: Were they discussing the case 
or the incident at all when you went in? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Did you ever hear them discuss 
it? 
THE WITNESS: They didn't know a thing 
about it. 
THE COURT: All right, you may 
cross-examine. 
MR. YENGICH: No cross-examination. 
Defense counsel immediately renewed his mistrial motion "on the 
basis of the record."4 Again, his motion was denied. 
4. See note 7, infra. 
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On appeal, defendant argues that/ "by informing the 
remaining jurors that the trial court had excused another juror 
and the reason for that excuse, the bailiff interfered with Mr. 
Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial jury/" guaranteed by 
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.5 He 
relies on the declaration in State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 
279-80 (Utah 1985)/ that "[a]nything more than the most 
incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and 
jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at 
best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality.M In 
Pike, an important prosecution witness (an arresting officer 
and eyewitness) engaged three jurors in conversation about a 
personal incident. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice from the juror-witness 
contact was established because "the conversation amounted to 
more than a brief/ incidental contact and no doubt had the 
effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the juror's judgment as to [the witness's] 
credibility." Pike. 712 P.2d at 281. Once such a presumption 
is raised/ the court reaffirmed/ the burden is on the 
prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not 
influence the juror.6 I£. at 280; see State v. Erickson, 749 
5. Although defendant mentions Article 1/ sections 10 and 12 
of the Utah Constitution in his appellate brief, this issue was 
neither raised below nor adequately briefed or argued on 
appeal. We therefore confine our analysis to the federal 
constitution. See State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45/ 51 
n.4 (Ct. App. 1990). 
6. This rule has its Utah roots in State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 
208/ 117 P. 58 (1911)/ in which two officers took the jury to 
lunch at a public hotel in the midst of their deliberations. 
One juror and one officer left the group and the juror talked 
to someone on the telephone. The record did not show whom the 
juror talked with or what was said. The court concluded: 
From the conduct disclosed and the 
exposure of the juror to harmful 
influences/ prejudice is presumed/ and the 
burden cast on the state to show what the 
communication was# and that it was 
harmless and could not have influenced or 
affected the deliberations of the juror or 
his verdict. 
Id./ 117 P. at 66. 
P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987)/ cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988). 
Pike identifies two reasons for the rule that a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arises from a nonincidental witness 
contact with a juror: (1) the inherent difficulty in proving 
how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by 
conversing with a participant in the trial, and (2) the 
deleterious effect upon the judicial process because of the 
appearance of impropriety from such contact. Pike, 712 P.2d at 
280. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate 
whether the denial of defendant's motion was based on a 
determination that the contact was incidental or that the 
contact was nonincidental, but the resulting presumption of 
prejudice was rebutted. On appeal, defendant assumes that the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was presumptively 
prejudicial because it was more than "a brief, incidental 
contact where only remarks of civility were exchanged." 
Erickson, 749 P.2d at 620. 
In light of the enunciated reasons for the rule reaffirmed 
in Pike, we conclude that the contact between the bailiff and 
the jurors before the jury began deliberating was an incidental 
contact raising no presumption of prejudice. Erickson and Pike 
and all the other Utah cases cited by defendant involved 
conversational contacts between a juror and a trial witness. 
In such circumstances, it is appropriate to characterize any 
verbal contact beyond mere civilities as nonincidental because 
it might influence the juror's ability to assess impartially 
the credibility of that witness. Jurors should not, as a 
matter of course, talk to witnesses about the case at hand or 
about anything else. According to Pike, the substance of any 
such conversation does not dictate application of the 
presumptive prejudice rule. The rule is applied, first, 
because of the potential for the conversation's subtle effect 
on the juror's ability to assess the credibility of the trial 
participant with whom he has conversed. Here, however, unlike 
the juror-witness cases relied upon by defendant, no 
"conversation" took place, in the normal sense of an "oral 
exchange of sentiments, observations, opinion^ [or] ideas." 
Webster's Third Infl Dictionary 458 (1986). [There was no 
exchange at all because the jurors said nothing^ The bailiff 
merely conveyed information about why juror Davis would not be 
present for the balance of the trial. In addition, the 
bailiff's credibility in the eyes of the jury was not at 
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issue. He did not testify. The truth of his statement to the 
jury was not relevant. 
We think the facts in this case are more like those in 
State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960), cert, 
denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961). In Garcia, the contact occurred 
at the same stage of the proceedings, i.e., after all the 
evidence was in, but before the jury was instructed or the case 
argued or submitted. A juror approached the trial judge and 
privately asked if the parties would introduce tapes of certain 
testimony. The judge responded that he did not know, but would 
advise counsel that the juror had inquired. Our supreme court 
pointed out that, -while in a sense the juror's conversation 
with the trial judge was on a subject connected with the 
trial," the judge's response was not. Garcia, 355 P.2d at 59. 
Although it would have been improper for the judge to discuss 
the issue with the juror, the court stated, the judge's actual 
response was proper. I&. The court saw "nothing about this 
situation which would tend to prejudice the defendant," 
distinguishing cases in which prejudice was presumed from a 
contact between a juror and a witness or interested party 
during the deliberative process. J&. 
Here, the bailiff's message to the jury had an even more 
tenuous connection to the subject of the trial itself than the 
verbal interchange in Garcia. Although it was not unintended, 
it was not the kind of communication which would prejudice the 
jury's judgment regarding their verdict in this case. 
The second reason identified in Pike for presuming 
prejudice is also absent here. Juror-prosecution witness 
contacts make the entire judicial process look collusive or 
unfair to the defendant. However, unlike verbal contacts 
between jurors and trial participants, verbal contacts beyond 
mere civilities between jurors and a bailiff, about subjects 
other than those connected with the trial at hand, are expected 
and unavoidable since the bailiff is assigned to minister to 
the jurors' needs and to be the contact person. We do not 
believe that Pike compels the conclusion that prejudice 
presumptively results when a bailiff says anything other than 
"Hello" or "Good morning" to a juror at a time when the case 
has not even been submitted to the jury for deliberations. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-9 (1990) (officer in charge of 
sequestered jury must not speak with jury "on any subject 
connected with the trial") with Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-11 
(1990) (officer in charge of jury in deliberations shall "not 
permit any person to speak to or communicate with them or to do 
so himself except upon the order of the court • . . . " ) ; see 
Still v. State, 484 P.2d 549 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
(unauthorized communication between bailiff and jury during its 
deliberations would raise presumption of prejudice). 
This bailiff did not mingle with the jurors or converse 
with them about the trial itself; nor did he interrupt their 
deliberations. His brief contact concerning something 
tangential to the trial itself did not give rise to any 
appearance of impropriety. Thus, the trial court could have 
properly concluded that the contact was incidental and raised 
no presumption of prejudice. 
Because we conclude that the juror-bailiff contact did not 
deny defendant his constitutional right to an impartial jury, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
request for a mistrial. See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
1988). 
MOTION HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Defendant claims that his right of appeal has been 
impermissibly impaired because the transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing on his mistrial motion is incomplete. 
Defense counsel agrees that the bailiff's contact with the 
jury, discussed above, was a basis for the initial mistrial 
motion,7 which was denied without prejudice. A hearing was 
7. Defendant's trial counsel filed an affidavit stating that 
he "thinks" he might have had a second ground for the renewed 
mistrial motion. If so, that ground would appear in the 
transcript of the proceedings. Appellate counsel has not 
identified a second ground for our consideration. Trial 
counsel's affidavit speculates that the purported second ground 
might have related to the prosecutor's closing argument. But 
the transcript of closing arguments is complete, without gaps, 
and without indication of an unintelligible word. Thus, any 
problem with argument could be identified by appellate 
counsel. Again, none has been directed to our attention. 
Moreover, the transcript reveals that defense counsel did not 
interpose any objection during the course of the prosecutor's 
argument. Counsel has the unfettered opportunity to interrupt 
at any time and request that any portion of an argument be 
recorded, and to voice any objection thereto he may desire. 
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1979). We conclude that 
the only actual ground for the renewed mistrial motion was the 
bailiff's conduct. 
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later held concerning the bailiff-jury contact/ at which the 
only witness called to testify was the bailiff. His testimony, 
fully quoted above, was short and direct and comported with 
defense counsel's report of the jury contact when stated as the 
ground for the initial motion. The bailiff's testimony 
concerning the content of his message to the jury did not give 
rise to a presumption of prejudice. Thus, the inquiry ended, 
and when defense counsel renewed the mistrial motion at the 
close of the testimony, it was again denied. The transcript of 
the court's inquiry, the bailiff's testimony, counsel's motion, 
and the court's ruling is complete. That portion of the 
transcript has no gaps and no indications of unintelligible 
words. The indication "(illegible)" appears solely in 
connection with statements of the court and counsel, which do 
not form the basis for defendant's claim that the jury was not 
impartial. Defense counsel's mistrial motion was renewed on 
the "basis of the record," i.e., the bailiff's testimony. 
The court reporters' transcripts are virtually complete and 
thus amply adequate for us to review defendant's claims. This 
transcript is not like the transcript in State v. Taylor, 664 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), where a new trial was ordered. There, a 
juror's responses to voir dire questions were totally absent 
from the record and could not be reconstructed. Here, the 
bailiff's testimony was totally reported, and there was no need 
to reconstruct the record.8 We find the transcript before us 
to be functionally adequate for review. Not all deficiencies 
or inaccuracies in the record require a new trial. State v. 
Perrv, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987). We conclude that the 
condition of the transcripts did not deprive defendant of due 
process or of the right of appeal guaranteed by Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-l-6(l)(g) (1990).9 
8. Here, the trial court attempted to "settle the record" due 
to defendant's claims about omissions. However, those 
omissions were not related to the material issues of this 
appeal as discussed in our analysis. 
9. Defendant received, at State expense, a full and complete 
transcript of his trial consisting of several volumes. He 
takes no issue with the adequacy of the transcripts except a 
portion of one volume that contains instructions to the jury, 
closing arguments, and the hearing on the mistrial motion. The 
court reporter for these proceedings on the final day of trial 
departed the state and could not be located to prepare that 
part of the transcript. The reporter at all other trial 
proceedings prepared the entire transcript, utilizing the 
written notes of the missing reporter. 
TRIAL JUDGE RECUSAL 
Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice against Judge 
Banks, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. He alleged that, twenty years earlier, the judge, 
as prosecutor, had been forced to dismiss certain criminal 
charges against him. Defendant claimed the judge still 
harbored resentment towards him arising from the dismissal. 
Defendant asserted actual bias of the judge against him, 
arising from that incident and from several other criminal 
prosecutions of defendant while Judge Banks was prosecuting 
attorney. 
The trial judge examined the matter consistent with the 
rule, Utah R. Crim. P. 29, and statutory procedure, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July 1, 
1990). The court compared defendant's factual allegations with 
the court files in each prior case. The court records 
demonstrated defendant's affidavit to be factually inaccurate 
concerning the judge's direct involvement in the several 
prosecutions, with one exception. The judge found that he had 
been personally involved in only one of defendant's prior 
prosecutions. Regarding that case, Judge Banks stated: 
[A] minute entry [is] endorsed on the 
Information showing that it was my motion 
to dismiss, and the others, the only basis 
for any prejudice would be that I was the 
District Attorney and that people who 
appeared in behalf of the State at the 
District Attorney's level were my deputies. 
The judge concluded that the defendant's affidavit was 
factually insufficient and that prejudice was not shown. The 
matter was referred to another trial judge for review pursuant 
to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d). That judge denied defendant's 
motion to disqualify Judge Banks and referred the case back to 
him for trial. 
Defendant has failed to show any actual bias requiring 
recusal. We consider State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), 
cert, denied. 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), to be controlling. In 
Neeley, Judge Banks, as prosecutor, had signed some criminal 
informations against defendants and had appeared in court in 
one case to accept a guilty plea. Based on those facts, the 
court found no actual bias, as required, and no grounds for 
reversal. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Judge Banks determined that he had no 
actual bias against defendant Belt by 
reason of his involvement in Belt's 
prosecution some twenty years prior. He 
then followed the statutorily mandated 
procedure to determine whether sufficient 
legal grounds existed to require his 
disqualification. While it has been 
suggested that a trial judge disqualify 
himself whenever an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice is filed against him in good 
faith, this practice is not mandatory. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. Continuing, the Court stated: 
But, while we recommend the practice that 
a judge recuse himself where there is a 
colorable claim of bias or prejudice, 
absent a showing of actual bias or an 
abuse of discretion, failure to do so does 
not constitute reversible error as long as 
the requirements of section 77-35-29 [Utah 
R. Crim. P. 29] are met. 
Id. 
In light of defendant's failure to establish actual bias or 
an abuse of discretion, Judge Banks did not commit reversible 
error by refusing to disqualify himself as trial judge. 
We affirm defendant's convictions. 
Norman H. Jacksonr Judge 
WE CON' 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
7^^/N^fa^K^ 
John Jvarr Larson, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the* accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury, of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . . 
